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We study monopolistic design of a menu of non-linear tariffs when consumers
have biased prior beliefs regarding their future preferences. In our model, con-
sumers are “optimistic” if their prior belief assigns too much weight to states of
nature characterized by large gains from trade. A consumer’s degree of optimism
is his private information, and the monopolist employs the menu of non-linear
tariffs to screen it. We characterize the optimal menu and show that the existence
of non-common priors has significant qualitative implications for price discrim-
ination and ex-post inefficiency. Finally, the characterization enables us to inter-
pret aspects of real-life menus of non-linear tariffs.
K. Contracts, speculative trade, screening, non-common priors, mecha-
nism design, optimism, three-part tariffs.
JEL . D42, D84, D86.
1. I
In many market situations, consumers need to create forecasts of their future prefer-
ences at the time they choose a supplier. Making travel and accommodation arrange-
ments for a future vacation, signing up for a mobile phone or cable TV, DVD rental, and
health care services, are instances of such situations. Given the time gap between the
acceptance and realization of the deal, it makes sense to assume that consumers lack
perfect knowledge of their future tastes and needs, especially when they are newcomers
to the markets.
Given the prevalence of these situations, surprisingly little has been written on the
question of how a monopolist would discriminate between consumers with diverse be-
liefs regarding their future tastes (notable exceptions are Baron and Besanko 1984, Arm-
strong 1996, Courty and Li 2000, and Miravete 2002, 2003). This literature invariably as-
sumes that although consumers are imperfectly informed about their future tastes, their
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beliefs are unbiased. However, the diversity in consumers’ beliefs may arise also from
inherent biases in prior beliefs. For example, consumers may systematically underesti-
mate the consumption quantity that will be required to satiate their need; inexperienced
consumers may be unaware of future contingencies that will affect their willingness to
pay for high quality products; finally, consumers may exaggerate the future benefits a
service will bring. Different consumers will exhibit different belief biases. The firm may
try to design its menu of pricing schemes to screen the degree of the consumer’s bias.
In this paper we study a simple two-period monopolistic contracting model that ad-
dresses this non-standard price discrimination problem. In our model, the monopolist
enables the consumer to choose in period 2 the quantity (or quality) of some good or
service, conditional on signing a contract in period 1. If the consumer refuses to sign
a contract, he is left with an outside option of known value. A contract is a non-linear
pricing scheme—that is, a function that assigns a (possibly negative) monetary transfer
from the consumer to the monopolist for every possible consumption quantity. Other
than that, we place no restriction on the space of contracts.
The consumer has quasi-linear vNM utility over second-period outcomes. His util-
ity from consumption is either u or v , depending on a state of nature, which is revealed
to the consumer alone in period 2. The monopolist has a cost function c . The consumer
assigns probability θ to state u . We assume that max(u − c )>max(v − c )—that is, max-
imal gains from trade are higher in state u than in state v . A higher θ thus represents a
more “optimistic” belief. The monopolist’s prior on the state u is p . The difference in the
parties’ beliefs is a pure difference in opinions; the consumer does not believe that the
monopolist is better informed than him, and the monopolist need not update his beliefs
as a result of the consumer’s first-period decision. We assume that the value of θ is the
consumer’s private information. The monopolist believes that θ is drawn from some
continuous cdf on [0, 1]. Thus, θ plays the role of a consumer “type.” The monopolist’s
problem is to design a menu of contracts that maximizes his expected profit.
The following simple example illustrates the model. Imagine an individual without
any driving experience who wishes to obtain a driver’s license, yet is unsure about the
number of driving lessons he will need to pass the driving test. In one state (the “low
ability”state), the individual passes only if he takes two lessons: a basic lesson and a
review lesson right before the test. In another state (the “high ability” state), the basic
lesson is necessary and sufficient for passing. He receives a payoff of 1 (0) if he passes
(fails). There is available one driving instructor, who incurs a cost of c < 12 from each
lesson. The instructor assigns probability p to the high-ability state. Note that the high-
ability state is characterized by larger gains from trade. Hence, a prior belief that assigns
a high probability to this state can be viewed as being “optimistic.”
If the individual were known to share the instructor’s prior, the latter could offer him
a flat-rate deal, which allows the individual to take as many lessons as he wants for a
fixed price of 1. This contract extracts the entire consumer surplus in each state, and
yields an expected profit of 1− [p · c + (1− p ) · 2c ]. Let us verify that this is indeed an
optimal contract. Denote the prices for the first and second lessons by t (1) and t (2),
respectively. In order for the individual to accept the contract, his expected payment
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cannot exceed his willingness to pay for passing the test. Since the individual must take
at least one lesson to pass, it must be the case that t (1)+ (1−p )t (2)≤ 1. In addition, the
second lesson cannot be so expensive that the individual will refuse to take it if he learns
that he is in the low-ability state. This means that 1− t (1)− t (2)≥−t (1). Similarly, in the
high-ability state the individual should not have an incentive to take a second lesson,
hence 1− t (1) ≥ 1− t (1)− t (2). The above flat-rate deal—i.e., t (1) = 1 and t (2) = 0—
maximizes the instructor’s expected profit given the three constraints.
Suppose next that the instructor knows that the individual overestimates his ability—
specifically, that he assigns probability θH > p to the high-ability state. The instructor
could still offer the flat-rate scheme; the individual would accept it and it would generate
the same expected profit as before. However, another possibility is to offer the individual
a variable-rate scheme, in which the prices of a basic lesson and a review lesson are θH
and 1, respectively. If the individual accepts this offer, then in the low-ability state he will
take both a basic lesson and a review, while in the high-ability state he will take only the
basic lesson. The individual’s expected payoff from this offer, calculated according to
his own prior belief, is zero, and so he would accept it. As for the instructor, this contract
is superior to the flat-rate scheme because it generates an expected profit, calculated
according to the instructor’s prior belief, of p ·(θH−c )+(1−p ) ·(θH+1−2c ) = (θH −p )+
1− [p · c + (1− p ) · 2c ]. Note that this conclusion relies on the fact that the state is not
contractible. If it were, the instructor and the individual could sign what is essentially
an infinite bet.
Alternatively, suppose that the instructor knows that the customer underestimates
his ability—specifically, that he assigns probability θ L < p to the high-ability state. The
instructor can offer a variable-rate scheme such as the one offered to the optimistic type,
except that the basic lesson’s price is θ L rather than θH . However, since θ L < p , this
contract generates a lower expected profit than the original flat-rate deal, which thus
constitutes the optimal contract for the pessimistic type.
The variable-rate scheme offered to the optimistic customer in this example is a
“speculative contract”—namely, a bet on whether the individual will opt for a review
lesson. An individual who shares the instructor’s beliefs would never accept this con-
tract. Note that if the instructor does not know which of the three types p , θH , or θ L he
is facing, he can simply ask the individual to choose between the flat-rate and variable-
rate schemes. The optimistic customer type will weakly prefer the latter, while the other
types will strictly prefer the former.
This example has several noteworthy features. First, the optimal menu of non-linear
pricing schemes contains a risky, speculative scheme as well as a safe scheme that guar-
antees the consumer his reservation value in each state. Second, the consumer’s be-
havior is independent of his choice of contract: he takes both lessons in the low-ability
state, while skipping the review lesson in the high-ability state. Thus, the multiplicity
of contracts has nothing to do with designing second-period incentives. Rather, its ob-
jective is to screen the consumer’s prior belief. Third, the three types do not exert any
informational externality on one another. This allows the instructor to screen the con-
sumer’s type at no cost. Finally, the instructor offers a speculative contract only to the
consumer type who is “optimistic” about his future needs.
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How general are these effects? In Section 4, we characterize the optimal menu of
contracts in the class of environments described above. In addition to the standard as-
sumptions (u and v are continuous, c is continuously increasing), we assume that at
some ex-post efficient quantity in the state v , u lies weakly below v . The driving school
example satisfies this condition. In Sections 3 and 4 we describe additional situations
of economic interest that meet this condition as well. However, our motivation for this
assumption is primarily methodological: it ensures that all “interesting” effects in our
model arise from non-common priors. In the common-prior benchmark, the optimal
menu consists of a single contract that maximizes gains from trade and fully extracts the
consumer’s surplus in each state. In contrast, in our model the optimal menu satisfies
the following properties.
Speculative contracts There exist two cutoff beliefs θ ∗ > p and θ∗ < p , such that opti-
mistic types (θ > θ ∗) are offered a speculative contract; pessimistic types (θ < θ∗)
are offered a speculative contract, too, as long as v lies strictly above u at some
point.
Exclusion from speculation The optimal menu does not exclude consumer types in the
usual sense of failing to transact with them. Nevertheless, there is exclusion, in the
sense that the contract offered to consumer types who roughly share the monopo-
list’s prior belief (θ ∈ (θ ∗,θ∗)) is the optimal contract under complete information
for θ = p . By definition, this is a non-speculative contract. It also has the property
that all types evaluate it at the reservation value.
Ex-post (in)efficiency The contracts assigned to types above θ ∗ induce an efficient out-
come in state v and a possibly inefficient outcome in state u . The contracts as-
signed to types below θ∗ induce an efficient outcome in state u and a possibly
inefficient outcome in state v (unless u lies weakly above v , in which case types
below p are offered the optimal contract under complete information for θ = p ).
This inefficiency arises from the speculation motive, and would exist also if the
monopolist knew the consumer’s type. In fact, in some environments the effi-
ciency loss is mitigated by the informational asymmetry.
Thus, in the class of environments studied in Sections 3 and 4 all price discrimina-
tion and ex-post inefficiency phenomena are purely artifacts of the consumer’s biased
beliefs and the betting motive they induce.
Admittedly, the simplifying assumption excludes some environments of economic
importance. Therefore, in Section 5 we analyze the model under the assumption that
both u and v are increasing concave functions, and that u ′ > v ′. This configuration of-
ten appears in textbook presentations of price discrimination models. In our context,
it complicates the monopolist’s considerations. First, the monopolist has a betting mo-
tive owing to the fact that the p 6= θ . Second, it faces a standard screening problem: a
consumer type θ > p can earn an informational rent by pretending to be θ ′ = p . The
conflation of these two motives makes the analysis less clear-cut than in the environ-
ment studied in Sections 3 and 4. Nevertheless, we provide a characterization of the
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optimal menu and show via an example that when u is sufficiently higher than v , our
model generates a prediction that is qualitatively distinct from the standard common-
prior model.
2. R 
Our paper is mostly related to the small “sequential screening” literature described
above, which studies non-linear pricing with imperfectly informed consumers. Both
this literature and our work study the problem of a monopolist that offers consumers a
menu of contingent pricing schedules. In both frameworks, the monopolist’s objective
is to screen consumers according to their unobservable prior beliefs over their future
tastes. However, in contrast to our model, the sequential screening literature assumes
common priors as well as common knowledge that the consumer is better informed
about his future tastes than the monopolist. We show the importance of this distinc-
tion: in some environments, non-common priors are necessary for price discrimination
to emerge.
Grubb (forthcoming) independently studies optimal contracting in the presence of
non-common priors. There are several notable differences between the two papers.
First, the two papers study different behavioral biases. We analyze consumers who may
be optimistic in the sense that relative to the monopolist, they assign a higher belief to
the state with the largest gains from trade. Grubb, on the other hand, studies consumers
whose second-period willingness to pay gets a continuum of values, and who are “over-
confident” in the sense that their subjective beliefs over second-period valuations are
too narrowly concentrated (relative to the actual distribution) around the mean.1 Sec-
ond, Grubb’s main focus is on the optimal contract under complete information and its
implementability by three-part tariffs (in the context of mobile phone services), while
we focus on price discrimination in the presence of incomplete information. Third, in
our model, the monopolist can perfectly monitor the amount consumed by the con-
sumer (as in the case of mobile phone services). Grubb, on the other hand, studies an
environment in which the monopolist has only imperfect monitoring ability and can
observe only the amount the consumer has bought but not how much he actually con-
sumed (as, for example, in a market for a perishable good).2
Fang and Moscarini (2005) study a principal-agent model with non-common priors,
and investigate the implications of non-common priors for the design of wage contracts.
Unlike us, they analyze contract design with an informed monopolist, and focus on the
signaling aspect of contracts. More specifically, they ask how a monopolist should de-
sign a wage contract when he holds the correct prior about his workers’ ability, whereas
their priors are biased upwards. A key assumption in the paper is that an optimistic be-
lief has a positive effect on a worker’s productivity. The monopolist, therefore, faces the
1In particular, Assumprion A* in Grubb (forthcoming), which captures consumers’ overconfidence, rules
out overoptimism in our sense.
2For other examples of real-life speculative contracts, see Bazerman and Gillespie (1999). For further
empirical discussion of whether consumers make systematic errors in anticipating their future tastes, see
Miravete (2003).
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following trade-off. On the one hand, he would like to provide the appropriate mone-
tary incentives for his workers to exert effort. On the other hand, he is concerned that
workers may infer their true ability from the contract he offers (what the authors call
“morale hazard”).
While this paper is concerned with monopolistic screening of a consumer’s prior
belief, there have been a few works on competitive screening of priors. Landier and
Thesmar (forthcoming) examine debt contracts that are signed between investors and
entrepreneurs who differ in their degrees of optimism. Assuming a competitive envi-
ronment, in which investors earn zero profits, the authors construct a separating equi-
librium in which entrepreneurs who are more optimistic than the investor choose short-
term debt, while entrepreneurs who share the investor’s belief choose long-term debt.
In relation to our model, short-term debt may be interpreted as a bet in which the en-
trepreneur concedes cash flow rights in the low state in return for claims on the good
state. The authors also provide empirical evidence suggesting that short-term debt is
correlated with optimistic expectation errors of entrepreneurs. Sandroni and Squintani
(2007) modify the Rothschild–Stiglitz insurance market model, to allow for consumers
who are over-optimistic regarding their probability of an accident. They show that al-
though in equilibrium these consumers are under-insured, compulsory insurance need
not be Pareto-improving. Uthemann (2005) shows how to adapt a Hotelling-like model
of competitive price discrimination due to Armstrong and Vickers (2001), in order to
study competitive screening of consumers’ prior beliefs regarding the future value of a
taste parameter.
Finally, this paper builds on our own previous work. Eliaz and Spiegler (2006) study
optimal contract design with dynamically inconsistent consumers. A consumer type
is his degree of naivete, modeled as his prior belief that his current preferences will
change in the future. By comparison, the monopolist believes that the consumer’s pref-
erences are sure to change. As in the present paper, the monopolist’s objective in Eliaz
and Spiegler (2006) is to screen consumers according to their prior beliefs. However,
time-inconsistency has important implications for the design of the optimal menu. In
particular, sophisticated types who believe that their tastes will change with high prob-
ability are assigned a contract that serves as a perfect commitment device: it induces
them to choose the action that maximizes their current utility.
Eliaz and Spiegler (2007, 2008, forthcoming) develop further the research agenda
of mechanism design when consumer types consist of their prior beliefs regarding fu-
ture payoffs. In these models, multiple agents hold different priors over an unverifiable
state of nature that affects the outcome of a game they are about to play. In the first
period, the agents negotiate over contracts that define side payments as a function of
the second-period game outcome. Thus, contracts are essentially bets over the second-
period outcome. These papers define a notion of “constrained interim-efficient bets,”
characterize them, and discuss their implementability in terms of the underlying game’s
payoff structure. Thus, the mechanism design problem in Eliaz and Spiegler (2007, 2008,
forthcoming) is concerned with interim efficiency, whereas in the present paper the mo-
nopolist’s aim is to maximize profit. Moreover, while the present paper assumes that
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only the consumer takes actions in the second period, in Eliaz and Spiegler (2007, 2008,
forthcoming) all parties to the first-period bets may take actions in the second period.
3. T 
A monopolist offers a consumer the opportunity to choose an action from the set [0, 1].
The cost of providing an action a is c (a ), where c is a continuous, non-decreasing, con-
vex function satisfying c (0) = 0. In order to have access to this set of actions, the con-
sumer must sign a contract with the monopolist one period beforehand. If the con-
sumer does not sign a contract with the monopolist, he chooses some outside option.
We refer to the period in which a contract is signed as period 1, and to the period in
which the action is chosen as period 2. A contract is a function t : [0, 1]→ R that spec-
ifies for every second-period action, a (possibly negative) transfer from the consumer
to the monopolist. The monopolist is perfectly able to monitor the consumer’s second-
period action.
The consumer has quasi-linear preferences over action–transfer pairs. We assume
that his net utility in period 1 from the outside option is zero. However, his preferences
over second-period actions depend on the state of nature. There are two possible states:
in state u the consumer’s preferences are represented by the function u : [0, 1] → R,
and in state v they are represented by the function v : [0, 1]→R. We assume that in each
state of nature there are non-negative gains from trade, and that the maximal gains from
trade in state u are higher than they are in state v , i.e.,
max
a
[u (a )− c (a )]>max
a
[v (a )− c (a )]≥ 0.
We therefore interpret u as the “good” state. Let eω denote an ex-post efficient action in
stateω∈ {u , v }.
The consumer believes that state u occurs with probability θ . Given our interpreta-
tion of u as the “good” state, a consumer with a higher θ may be regarded as a consumer
with a higher degree of “optimism.” Faced with a contract t , the consumer’s indirect
utility from the contract is
θ max
a∈[0,1][u (a )− t (a )]+ (1−θ ) maxa∈[0,1][v (a )− t (a )].
The monopolist believes that u occurs with probability p , independently of the con-
sumer’s belief. Thus, from the monopolist’s point of view, the consumer’s beliefs are in-
correct. A consumer type θ > p (θ < p ) overestimates (underestimates) the expected
maximal gains from trade in the second period. We assume that any difference between
the two parties’ beliefs is purely due to differences in prior opinion. In Section 6 we dis-
cuss the interpretation of this assumption, as well as the implications of allowing p to
depend on θ .
A complete characterization of the optimal menu in the above environment turns
out to be a difficult task. To simplify our analysis, we restrict attention to environments
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in which the utility functions u and v and the cost function c satisfy the additional
property
v (e v )≥ u (e v ) for all e v . (*)
This property accommodates a number of economically relevant environments. For in-
stance, suppose that the consumer’s future preferences have a satiation point. Suppose
further that the consumer has no uncertainty about the satiation payoff, but is unsure
about the location of the satiation point. Such is the case when the consumer is in-
terested in achieving some goal—passing a test (driving, SAT), quitting smoking, losing
weight—but is unsure of the amount of effort (number of classes) required to attain that
goal. If costs are sufficiently low, then these environments satisfy property (*).
Our environment also accommodates situations in which the consumer does not
know whether he will like the product at all. That is, he is not sure whether his utility
will rise with consumption. A similar situation arises when the consumer is a TV station
that buys reruns from major networks and may be uncertain as to whether increasing
the dose of reality TV shows at the expense of other genres will cause ratings to rise or
fall.
As we show in the next section, property (*) is methodologically useful in that it pre-
cludes discrimination between consumer types when prior beliefs are common (yet pri-
vately known by the consumer). This provides us with a sharp benchmark to be com-
pared with the non-common priors case. We examine environments that violate prop-
erty (*) in Section 5.
4. A
4.1 Optimal contracts under complete information
We begin by investigating the problem facing a monopolist who observes the con-
sumer’s prior belief θ . Its objective is to design a contract tθ : [0, 1]→R that maximizes
expected profit subject to the following constraints: (i) according to the consumer’s be-
liefs, the contract offers him in expectation at least his reservation payoff and (ii) after
each state is realized, the consumer chooses the best action for him, given the contract.
Formally stated, the monopolist solves the maximization problem
max
tθ
{p [tθ (a uθ )− c (a uθ )]+ (1−p )[tθ (a vθ )− c (a vθ )]}
subject to the constraint
θ [u (a uθ )− tθ (a uθ )]+ (1−θ )[v (a vθ )− tθ (a vθ )]≥ 0, (IRθ )
where
a uθ ∈ arg max
a∈[0,1]
[u (a )− tθ (a )] (UIθ )
a vθ ∈ arg max
a∈[0,1]
[v (a )− tθ (a )]. (VIθ )
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We refer to a contract tθ that solves this problem as an optimal contract for type θ under
complete information.
The conditions UIθ and VIθ represent the fact that a consumer’s indirect utility from
a contract is determined by the actions he expects to choose in the two states. If the
realized state in period 2 is u (v )—an event to which the consumer assigns probability
θ (1−θ )—he will choose the optimal action according to the utility function u (v ). This
is represented by the constraint UIθ (VIθ ).
It follows that any contract t can be identified with a pair of actions (a uθ , a
v
θ ). The
first action is consistent with u -maximization in the second period, whereas the second
action is consistent with v -maximization in the second period. Without loss of general-
ity, we assume that t (a ) = +∞ for every a /∈ {a vθ , a uθ }. With slight abuse of terminology,
we henceforth refer to the inequality
u (a uθ )− tθ (a uθ )≥ u (a vθ )− tθ (a vθ )
as the UIθ constraint and to the inequality
u (a uθ )− tθ (a uθ )≥ u (a vθ )− tθ (a vθ )
as the VIθ constraint.
P 1. Assume the monopolist knows the consumer’s prior belief θ . Then the
optimal contract for each consumer type has the following properties.
(i) If p <θ , then
a vθ = e
v
a uθ = arg max
a
{[θ −p ][u (a )−v (a )]+p [u (a )− c (a )]}
and
tθ (a uθ ) = v (a
u
θ )+θ [u (a
u
θ )−v (a uθ )] (1)
tθ (a vθ ) = v (a
v
θ )+θ [u (a
u
θ )−v (a uθ )]. (2)
(ii) If p >θ , then
a uθ = e
u
a vθ = arg max
a
{[p −θ ][v (a )−u (a )]+ [1−p ][v (a )− c (a )]}
and
tθ (a uθ ) = u (a
u
θ )− (1−θ )[u (a vθ )−v (a vθ )] (3)
tθ (a vθ ) = u (a
v
θ )− (1−θ )[u (a vθ )−v (a vθ )]. (4)
(iii) If p = θ , then aωθ = e
ω and t (aωθ ) =ω(e
ω) for allω= u , v .
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The optimal contract under complete information has two interesting features.
First, when the monopolist and the consumer hold different prior beliefs, the contract
induces the consumer to choose the ex-post efficient action in the state for which the
monopolist’s prior is higher than the consumer’s. That is, if the optimal contract requires
some inefficiency, the monopolist prefers to have this inefficiency in the state he deems
less likely relative to the consumer. Second, when the monopolist and the consumer
share the same prior belief, the optimal contract is ex-post efficient and in each state
the monopolist extracts the entire consumer surplus.
Note that the optimal contract under complete information for θ = p is independent
of θ . This has the following important implication.
C 1. Suppose the monopolist believes that the consumer’s private information
(his prior belief θ ) is the true objective probability of u . Then it is optimal to offer all
consumer types an ex-post efficient contract that extracts the entire consumer surplus in
each state.
This result follows from observing that even if the monopolist could observe the con-
sumer’s belief, the optimal contract would not depend on it. Thus, whenever property
(*) holds, the common-prior benchmark is especially stark as there is no price discrim-
ination at the stage at which contracts are signed, since all consumer types are offered
exactly the same contract. Thus, in this environment consumers are offered a menu with
several distinct contracts only as a result of the monopolist’s attempt to earn speculative
gains from (what he considers to be) consumers’ biased beliefs.
The proof of Proposition 1 reveals another interesting feature of the optimal con-
tract under complete information: the monopolist believes that a consumer of type θ is
better off rejecting the complete-information optimal contract, which is aimed at him.
In other words, the consumer would not have signed the contract had he shared the
monopolist’s beliefs. We refer to a contract with this property as a speculative contract.
Formally, we make the following definition.
D 1. A contract tθ is speculative if
p [u (a uθ )− t (a uθ )]+ (1−p )[v (a vθ )− t (a vθ )]< 0.
By this definition, complete-information optimal contracts for θ 6= p are speculative,
whereas the complete-information optimal contract for θ = p is not speculative. The
distinction between speculative and non-speculative contracts plays an important role
in the next subsection.
4.2 Optimal contracts under incomplete information
The assumption that the monopolist observes the consumer’s prior belief is clearly
strong. A more realistic assumption is that the monopolist has some subjective prob-
ability distribution over the consumer’s degree of optimism. Furthermore, in many of
the economic environments referred to in the Introduction, we observe that suppliers
offer a menu of contracts rather than a single contract. This suggests that firms have
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incomplete information about the consumer’s belief of his future preferences (whether
biased or unbiased) and use menus to screen it.
Assume the monopolist does not know the value of θ , but believes that it is dis-
tributed over [0, 1] according to a continuous, strictly increasing cdf F (θ ). Thus, the
consumer’s “type” consists of his prior on u . The monopolist’s objective is to maximize
expected profit. By the revelation principle, a solution to his problem can be obtained
via a direct mechanism, in which consumers are asked to report their type, and each
reported type φ is assigned a contract tφ : [0, 1] → R. An optimal menu of contracts
{tθ (a )}θ∈[0,1] is a solution of the maximization problem
max{tθ (a )}θ∈[0,1]
∫ 1
0
{p [tθ (a uθ )− c (a uθ )]+ (1−p )[tθ (a vθ )− c (a vθ )]}d F (θ )
subject to the IRθ , UIθ , and VIθ constraints described above, and the additional incen-
tive compatibility constraint, which states that for all φ ∈ [0, 1], a consumer of type θ
cannot be better off by pretending to be of type φ and signing the contract assigned to
that type. Denote Duθ ≡ u (a uθ )− tθ (a uθ ) and Dvθ ≡ u (a vθ )− tθ (a vθ ). That is, Dωθ is the net
payoff the consumer expects to get in state ω. Then the incentive compatibility con-
straints can be written as
θDuθ +(1−θ )Dvθ ≥ θDuφ +(1−θ )Dvφ . (ICθ ,φ)
Define U (φ,θ ) to be the expected payoff of a type θ consumer who pretends to be
of type φ—that is, U (φ,θ )≡ θDuφ + (1−θ )Dvφ . Then, IRθ and ICθ ,φ can be rewritten as
U (θ ,θ ) ≥ 0 and U (θ ,θ ) ≥U (φ,θ ) for all θ and φ. We sometimes use the abbreviated
notation t ωθ ≡ tθ (aωθ ) and cωθ ≡ c (aωθ ), forω= u , v .
The previous subsection introduced the notion of a speculative contract, which
turns out to be especially useful in characterizing optimal menus. Our first observation
concerns the structure of non-speculative contracts in optimal menus. Let t ∗ denote the
optimal contract under complete information for an agent of type θ = p .
L 1. Without loss of generality, an optimal menu of contracts includes no non-
speculative contract other than t ∗.
This result is based on the observation that the contract t ∗ induces the reserva-
tion value for all consumer types. Therefore, including it in the menu of contracts does
not add an incentive compatibility constraint. In addition, among all possible non-
speculative contracts, this contract generates the highest expected profit for the mo-
nopolist. Therefore, if the menu contained other non-speculative contracts, it would
be profitable for the monopolist to replace all of them with the optimal contract under
complete information for θ = p .
Our next result presents several noteworthy features of optimal menus. First, there
exist optimal menus that partition the set of types into three regions. The lowest and
highest regions contain those types whose prior beliefs are furthest from the monop-
olist. These consumers sign contracts that are essentially bets on their second-period
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actions. The middle region in between the two cutoffs consists of consumers who more-
or-less share the monopolist’s beliefs. These consumers are excluded from betting with
the monopolist and are therefore assigned non-speculative contracts that fully extract
their ex-post consumer surplus in each state.
P 2. The monopolist can design optimal menus with the following properties.
There is a pair of cutoffs, θl , θh , where θl < p <θh , such that
(i) all types in the range (θl ,θh ) are assigned the optimal non-speculative contract,
whereas types in the ranges [0,θl ] and [θh , 1] are assigned speculative contracts
(ii) the [0, p ] problem is independent of the [p , 1] problem
(iii) for each θ ≥ θh , the action a vθ is ex-post efficient, the constraint VIθ is binding, and
Dθu > 0 while D
θ
v < 0
(iv) for each θ ≤ θl , the action a uθ is ex-post efficient, the constraint UIθ is binding, and
Dθu < 0 while D
θ
v > 0
(v) when u (a )≥ v (a ) for all a , θl = 0.
Thus, speculative contracts offered to types θ < p exert no informational externality
on types θ > p , and vice versa. The only incentive constraints that the monopolist needs
to worry about are those that prevent consumers who are more (less) optimistic than the
monopolist to downplay their optimism (pessimism). This simplifies the derivation of
an optimal menu, in that it breaks it down into three separate problems: (i) solving for
the optimal menu for θ ≥ θh , (ii) solving for the optimal menu for θ ≤ θl , and (iii) solving
for the non-speculative contract for θl < θ < θh . When u lies weakly above v , there is
further simplification because the cutoff θl becomes irrelevant.
Note that in an optimal menu, speculative contracts preserve the property that the
outcome is ex-post efficient in the state the monopolist deems more likely than the con-
sumer. However, Proposition 2 does not characterize the possibly inefficient outcome in
the other state. For such a characterization, we need to impose additional assumptions
on F . Denote z = 1−x and G (z ) = 1− F (1−x ), and define
ψF (x ) = x − 1− F (x )
f (x )
. (5)
DefineψG (z ) accordingly.
The next result characterizes the actions induced by optimal menus of contracts. To
simplify the exposition we characterize the payments induced by this menu in a sepa-
rate proposition below.
P 3. (i) If F satisfies the monotone hazard rate condition, then for every
θ ≥ θh ,
a uθ ∈ arg max
a
{[ψF (θ )−p ][u (a )−v (a )]+p [u (a )− c (a )]}, (6)
where θh is the unique solution of ψF (θ ) = p .
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(ii) If G satisfies the monotone hazard rate condition, then for every θ ≤ θl ,
a vθ ∈ arg max
a
{[ψG (1−θ )− (1−p )][v (a )−u (a )]+ [1−p ][v (a )− c (a )]},
where θl is the unique solution of ψG (1−θ ) = 1−p .
Thus, when F and G satisfy the monotone hazard rate property,3 the action chosen
by the consumer in the state he deems more likely than the monopolist has the following
interesting property: it maximizes a weighted sum of the total surplus in that state and
the difference between u and v . To interpret this observation, consider a speculative
contract signed by a type θ > p . This contract satisfies the VIθ constraint with equality,
and the consumer’s indirect utility from the contract may be written as
θ [u (a uθ )−v (a uθ )]+Dvθ . (7)
Since the monopolist’s prior on v is higher than the consumer’s, the contract may be
viewed as a bet in which the monopolist bets on v and the consumer bets on u . The
probability that the consumer wins the bet is θ . From the point of view of the mo-
nopolist (who expects to win the bet), the consumer’s ex-post utility will be Dvθ . The
consumer accepts the contract because of the extra term θ [u (a uθ )− v (a uθ )]. Therefore,
u (a uθ )−v (a uθ )may be viewed as the consumer’s “speculative gain.”
We now provide an outline of the proof of Proposition 3. By part (ii) of Proposition 2,
we can solve two separate optimization problems, one for types below p and another
for types above p . Consider the types in [p , 1]. Since the contracts offered for these
types induce an ex-post efficient action in state v (see part (iii) of Proposition 2), the
monopolist’s objective function may be written as
max
θh ,{a uθ ,t uθ }θ∈[θh ,1]

F (θh )− F (p )
1− F (p )

p [u (e u )− c (e u )]+ (1−p )[v (e v )− c (e v )]	
+
∫ 1
θh

p [tθ (a uθ )− c (a uθ )]+ (1−p )[tθ (e v )− c (e v )]	d F (θ )1− F (p )

.
Since the VIθ constraint of these types is binding (part (ii) of Proposition 2), the monop-
olist’s expected profit from types at or above θh equals∫ 1
θh

(1−p )[v (e v )− c (e v )−v (a uθ )+ c (a uθ )]+ tθ (a uθ )− c (a uθ )	d F (θ )1− F (p )

. (8)
Following standard practice in the mechanism design literature, we solve the “relaxed
problem” obtained by assuming the solution is incentive compatible, individually ratio-
nal, and also satisfies the second-period incentive constraints (UI and VI). This amounts
3The distribution F satisfies the monotone hazard rate condition if the ratio f (x )/[1 − F (x )] is non-
decreasing in x . For example, if the density function induced by F is symmetric around θ = 1
2
, then F
satisfies the monotone hazard rate if and only if G satisfies it as well.
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to using the integral representation of the ICθ constraint, together with the fact that the
VIθ constraint is binding, to replace the expression for tθ (a uθ ) with an expression that
depends only on a uθ . We then substitute this expression into (8) and use integration by
parts to rewrite (8) as∫ 1
θh

[ψF (θ )−p ][u (a uθ )−v (a uθ )]+p [u (a uθ )− c (a uθ )]	d F (θ ).
Since we have already incorporated the incentive constraints into the objective func-
tion, we can maximize the above expression point-by-point, which yields the solution
described in (6).
To complete the proof it remains to verify that all the constraints we assumed to be
satisfied at the solution are indeed satisfied. Since type θ ’s expected utility from truth-
telling may be written as (7), the incentive compatibility constraints hold if and only
if the difference u (a uθ )− v (a uθ ) is non-negative at θh and non-decreasing in θ (see the
Claim in the proof of the proposition). This allows us also to establish that the IRθ con-
straint holds for all θ > θh once we construct type θh ’s contract so that it satisfies this
type’s individual rationality constraint with equality. The payments made by each type
are designed to satisfy the VIθ constraint with equality (see Proposition 4 below). This
implies that the UIθ constraint is satisfied if and only if u (a uθ )− v (a uθ ) ≥ u (e v )− v (e v ).
But this inequality follows from property (*) and the result that u (a uθ )− v (a uθ )≥ 0 for all
θ ≥ θh .
P 4. (i) If F satisfies the monotone hazard rate condition, then in state u the
cutoff type θ = θh makes the payment
tθh (a
u
θh
) = p [u (e u )+ c (a uθh )− c (e u )]+ (1−p )v (a uθh )
and any higher type makes the payment
tθ (a uθ ) = v (a
u
θ )+θ [u (a
u
θ )−v (a uθ )]−
∫ θ
θh
[u (a ux )−v (a ux )]d x .
The payment made by each type θ ≥ θh in state v is given by
tθ (e v ) = tθ (a uθ )−v (a uθ )+v (e v ).
(ii) If G satisfies the monotone hazard rate condition, then in state v the cutoff type
θ = θl makes the payment
tθl (a
v
θl
) = p u (a vθl )+ (1−p )[v (e v )+ c (a vθl )− c (e v )]
and any higher type makes the payment
tθ (a vθ ) = v (a
v
θ )+θ [u (a
v
x )−v (a vx )]+
∫ θ l
θ
[u (a vx )−v (a vx )]d x .
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The payment made by each type θ ≤ θl in state u is given by
tθ (e u ) = tθ (a vθ )−u (a vθ )+u (e u ).
To understand how these transfers are constructed, consider the types in [θh , 1]. The
threshold type θh has the property that the monopolist is indifferent between offering
him a speculative and a non-speculative contract. By Lemma 1, the non-speculative
contract is ex-post efficient, hence the monopolist’s expected profit from this contract is
p [u (e u )− c (e u )]+ (1−p )[v (e v )− c (e v )].
The monopolist’s expected profit from a speculative contract offered to type θ is given
by the integrand in expression (8). It follows that the payment tθ (a uθh ) equates these two
amounts. The payment made by each type θ > θh in state u is computed by equating
U (θ ,θ ), as given in (7), with the integral representation of the ICθ constraint,
U (θ ,θ ) =
∫ θ
θh
[u (a ux )−v (a ux )]d x ,
assuming the VIθ constraint is binding (which allows us to substitute v (a uθ )− tθ (a uθ ) for
v (e v )−tθ (e v )). We then verify that indeed the VIθ constraint is binding by simply letting
tθ (e v ) = tθ (a uθ )−v (a uθ )+v (e v ). The transfers made by types in [0,θl ] are constructed in
an analogous way.
Our final result in this section shows that an optimal menu almost always contains
a speculative contract.
P 5. The optimal menu always contains a non-speculative contract. It con-
tains no speculative contracts if and only if p = 1 and u (a )≥ v (a ) for all a .
The following examples illustrate the type of contracts that can be found in an op-
timal menu. These examples also illustrate some of the applications that fit the current
environment. The examples are highly stylized and are not meant to serve as descriptive
models of the concrete economic environments referred to. However, we believe they
illuminate pricing schemes that we observe in reality.
E 1 (Flat-rate versus variable-rate price schemes). A commonly observed menu
of pricing schemes offers unlimited consumption at a flat rate, side-by-side with a
variable-rate scheme that charges according to consumption. Menus of this kind are
found in the telecom industry, where firms often offer a choice between “unlimited call-
ing plans” and plans that condition the per-minute rate on the number of minutes used.
Similarly, DVD rental stores offer “unlimited plans” as well as “limited plans.” Coffee
shops allow customers to purchase a prepaid debit card that entitles them to a certain
number of cups, side-by-side with the usual on-the-spot orders. Finally, as in the exam-
ple presented in the Introduction, driving schools and learning centers that offer prep
courses for SAT/GMAT/TOEFL sometimes offer students a choice between a package
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that provides a basic course and an option to take additional lessons at an extra charge,
and a package in which the student can take as many classes as he wants.
We propose to interpret such a menu as a tool for screening consumers according to
their prior beliefs over their future satiation point (where there is no uncertainty about
the satiation payoff ). How many lessons will the consumer need in order to pass a test?
Will the consumer need a lot of airtime to communicate with friends and colleagues on
the mobile phone, or will short conversations suffice? How many DVDs will he need
to watch to satiate his taste for films? A variable-rate contract may be viewed as a bet,
where the consumer “wins” if he manages to consume only a small amount and the mo-
nopolist “wins” if the consumer ends up consuming a large amount. In contrast, an un-
limited consumption contract has no speculative component, because the payment the
consumer makes is equal to his satiation payoff and therefore independent of his level
of consumption. Consumers who believe that their satiation point is likely to be low
prefer a speculative, variable-rate contract, whereas consumers who believe that their
satiation point is likely to be high opt for the non-speculative, unlimited-consumption
contract.
We illustrate this idea with an extension of the driving school example of the Intro-
duction. Consider a student who has several weeks to prepare for his first College Board
exam. This student contemplates purchasing a package from a learning center. Having
never taken such an exam before, the student does not know how many lessons he will
need to pass the exam. Formally, let a denote the amount of preparation the student
acquires (where a = 1 means that a consumer takes every available lesson before the
exam). The cost to the learning center is given by c (a ) = 14 a . Let u and v represent the
student’s willingness to pay in the “low” and “high” states. Specifically, let v (a ) = a and
u (a ) =min(2a , 1). Let F (θ ) = θ and p = 12 .
From the learning center’s point of view, a student of type θ > 12 (θ <
1
2 ) underes-
timates (overestimates) the amount of prep work he will require. Since u lies weakly
above v , Proposition 2 implies that the learning center will offer a non-speculative con-
tract to types below θh >
1
2 . Such a contract can be implemented by a package that offers
an unlimited number of lessons until the exam, for a flat fee of 1. Turning to the specu-
lative contracts in the menu, Proposition 2 implies that a vθ = 1 for all θ ≥ θh . It can be
shown that this proposition also implies that
a uθ ∈ arg max
a∈[0,1]
[(2θ −1)u (a )+ ( 54 −2θ )a ].
Solving this optimization problem yields a uθ =
1
2 , independently of θ . Thus, all types
above θh end up taking an ex-post efficient action in both states. This in turn implies
that the optimal menu contains a single speculative contract, denoted t s , in addition to
the optimal non-speculative contract.
Recall that VIθ is binding for every θ ≥ θh and that IRθ is binding for θh . More-
over, at the cutoff θh , the monopolist is indifferent between the speculative and non-
speculative contracts. It follows that θh = 34 . The binding constraints IRθh and VIθh then
imply t s (1) = 118 and t
s ( 12 ) =
7
8 . The speculative contract t
s can be implemented by a
two-part tariff: t (0) = 0 and t (a ) = 38 +a for a > 0.
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In this example, flat-rate, unlimited-consumption pricing schemes are non-
speculative contracts, while limited plans with extra charges for additional consump-
tion are speculative contracts aimed at consumers who optimistically underestimate
their satiation quantity. However, this classification is sensitive to the specification of u
and v . For instance, let u (a ) = 2a and v (a ) =min(2a , 1). The interpretation of this alter-
native specification is that in state v , the consumer reaches satiation at a = 12 , whereas
in state u he is willing to pay for additional units. In this case, there is an optimal menu
consisting of a variable-rate scheme, t (a ) = 2a for all a , as well as a flat-rate scheme,
t (a ) = 74 for all a . The former is a non-speculative contract selected by types θ ≤ 34 ,
whereas the latter is a speculative contract selected by types θ > 34 . All consumer types
end up taking ex-post efficient actions in both states (a u = 1, a v = 12 ). Thus, the classifi-
cation of flat-rate and variable-rate contracts as speculative or non-speculative depends
on the fine details of u and v . ◊
E 2 (Speculative contracts and inefficiency). In many situations, buyers con-
tract with a supplier prior to knowing the exact specifications of the product or service
they require, because these depend on the future realization of a state of nature. Bilat-
eral contracts of this nature have been widely studied in the literature. Most often, the
focus has been on the hold-up problem that may arise and its various remedies (see Ti-
role 1999 and the references therein). However, the manner in which these contingent
contracts allow for speculation (see Bazerman and Gillespie 1999) has been largely over-
looked by theorists. Our next example captures a contracting situation of this kind. We
employ this example to demonstrate the subtle effect of speculative contracts on ex-post
efficiency.
A seller can provide (at zero cost) a product of any variety a ∈ [0, 1] demanded by a
buyer. The ideal variety for the buyer depends on the state of nature. Assume that u and
v take the functional forms
u (a ) = 3− (a − 12 )2
v (a ) = 2− (a − 34 )2.
That is, the buyer’s ideal variety is a = 12 in state u and a =
3
4 in state v , and, moreover,
state u is characterized by higher demand. Let F (θ ) = θ and p = 12 .
For brevity, we focus on the contracts that the seller designs for types θ ∈ [ 12 , 1]. The
non-speculative contract for types 12 ≤ θ < θh extracts the entire consumer surplus in
each state. Let us turn to the speculative contracts for types θ ≥ θh . We first note that for
each of these types, a vθ can be set to
3
4 . From the proof of Proposition 2, it follows that to
compute a uθ for θ ≥ θ h we need to solve
max
a∈[0,1]

[(2θ −1)− 12 ][1+(a − 34 )2− (a − 12 )2]+ 12 [2− (a − 12 )2]
	
,
yielding
a uθ =
5
4 −θ .
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Finally, from the fact that the monopolist is indifferent between betting and not betting
with the cutoff type θh , it follows that θh = 34 .
Note that a uθ ≤ arg max u for all θ ≥ 34 . Since a uθ decreases with θ , the distance
between a uθ and arg max u increases with θ (in the range θ >
3
4 ). Thus as the parties’
prior beliefs become more polarized, the contract they sign becomes more inefficient
ex-post (in state u ).
If the seller could observe the buyer’s type θ , he would assign to any buyer type θ > 12
a speculative contract that induces a vθ =
3
4 and
a uθ = arg max[(θ −p )(u −v )+p u ] = 34 − 12θ .
Compare this with our result that when the seller does not observe θ ,
a uθ =
1
2 for θ ∈ [ 12 , 34 )
and
a uθ =
5
4 −θ for θ > 34 .
It is easy to see that the outcome is “less inefficient” ex-post when the seller does not
observe the buyer’s type. Thus, if a social planner who wishes to maximize social surplus
(according to his own prior beliefs) had to choose between an environment in which the
seller observes the buyer’s prior and an environment in which the buyer’s prior is his
private information, he would prefer the latter environment.4
Note that in contrast to previous examples, the optimal menu here displays fine dis-
crimination among optimistic types. Specifically, there is a continuum of speculative
contracts. To characterize these contracts for θ > 34 , recall that VIθ is binding for these
types. Therefore,
t (a vθ )− t (a uθ ) = ( 12 −θ )2.
This means that the higher the buyer’s prior on u , the larger the difference between the
payments he makes in the two states. ◊
5. A  
Our analysis in the previous section highlighted the necessity of non-common priors in
generating price discrimination at the signing stage. The key assumption behind this
result is property (*). Although this property can accommodate a number of situations
of economic interest, it does rule out environments that are commonly studied in the
literature. In particular, for the canonical textbook environment in which both u and v
are increasing, concave functions, property (*) requires that there be no positive gains
from trade in state v . In this section we characterize the optimal menu for this canonical
environment in the absence of property (*). Let u (0) = v (0) = 0, u ′(a ) > v ′(a ) for all a ,
and u ′′, v ′′ < 0. In addition, assume that F satisfies the monotone hazard rate condition.
4These welfare implications are not general, but a consequence of certain features of the payoff struc-
ture: (i) v (a ) ≡ u (a − d ), where d is the distance between the ideal points in the two states; (ii) u is
concave—i.e., as the distance from the ideal point becomes larger, the marginal disutility from steering
away from it increases; (iii) the Arrow–Pratt coefficient −u ′′/u ′ increases with a (in the relevant range, in
which a falls below the ideal point).
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5.1 Optimal contracts under complete information
We begin by considering the optimal contract when the monopolist faces a consumer
whose type θ is known. Proposition 1 characterizes this contract for the three possible
case, θ > p , θ < p , and θ = p . It is straightforward to show that the optimal contracts
under complete information for types θ 6= p in the current environment are precisely
the same as those characterized by Proposition 1. Property (*) is applied in the original
proof only to verify that the UIθ and VIθ constraints are satisfied. In the current en-
vironment, this follows from the assumption that u lies above v , and that u (a )− v (a )
increases with a .
Property (*) also plays a key role in showing that when θ = p , the monopolist of-
fers the consumer an ex-post efficient contract that extracts the entire ex-post surplus
in each state. In the present environment, the optimal contract under complete infor-
mation continues to be ex-post efficient. However, since property (*) does not hold, the
UIθ and VIθ constraints would be violated if the consumer were required to surrender
his entire ex-post surplus in each state. Because the contract tθ extracts the consumer’s
entire ex-ante surplus, the transfers tθ (e u ) and tθ (e v ) lie on the line
θ tθ (e u )+ (1−θ )tθ (e v ) = θu (e u )+ (1−θ )v (e v ).
The UIθ and VIθ constraints further imply that these transfers must lie between the
point given by (1)–(2) and the point given by (3)–(4).
5.2 Optimal contracts under incomplete information
We now turn to the monopolist’s problem when consumer types are unobserved. The
following proposition characterizes optimal menus of contracts in this case.
P 6. The monopolist can design optimal menus with the following properties.
There exists a pair of cutoffs, θ ∗ ∈ [0, 1] and θ¯ ∈ [θ ∗, 1), such that
(i) if θ ∗ > 0, then for all θ < θ ∗, a uθ = e u , tθ (e u ) = u (e u ), a vθ = 0, and tθ (0) = 0
(ii) if θ¯ > θ ∗, then for all θ ∈ [θ ∗, θ¯ ), the induced actions are
a uθ = a
v
θ
= arg max
a∈[0,1]

[ψ(θ )−p ][u (a )−v (a )]+p [u (a )− c (a )]+ (1−p )[v (a )− c (a )]	 (9)
and the payments for these actions are given by
tθ ∗ (a uθ ∗ ) = p [u (e
u )− c (e u )+ c (a θ ∗ )]− (1−p )[v (e v )− c (e v )−v (a θ ∗ )]
tθ (a uθ ) = v (a
u
θ )+θ [u (a
u
θ )−v (a uθ )]−
∫ θ
θ ∗
[u (a ux )−v (a ux )]d x (10)
and tθ (a vθ ) = tθ (a
u
θ )
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(iii) for all θ ∈ [θ¯ , 1], the induced actions are a vθ = e v and
a uθ ∈ arg max
a∈[0,1]
{[ψ(θ )−p ][u (a )−v (a )]+p [u (a )− c (a )]} (11)
and the payments for these transfers are given by (10) and tθ (e v ) = tθ (a uθ )−v (a uθ )+
v (e v ).
Thus, the optimal menu partitions the set of types into at most three regions. The
types in the lowest region are assigned a contract that essentially excludes them from
transacting with the monopolist in the low state v . This contract guarantees all types
their reservation payoff. Consumer types in the middle region are assigned contracts
that commit them to the same action in both states. This action may be different for
each type in this region, and it may be inefficient in both states. Finally, types in the
highest range are assigned contracts that induce the efficient action in state v and a
possibly inefficient action in state u . Thus, the contracts assigned to these types retain
the feature of the complete-information optimal contracts that efficiency is maintained
in the state the monopolist deems more likely than the consumer.
The absence of property (*) implies that some of the arguments we employed in
proving Proposition 2 are not valid in the present environment. Consequently, the proof
of Proposition 6 is somewhat more involved than the proof of Proposition 2. In what
follows we give a brief outline of the proof.
One important implication of relaxing property (*) is that the monopolist cannot
offer a non-speculative contract that satisfies ex-post efficiency and fully extracts con-
sumer surplus in each state. The reason is that such a contract would violate one of the
second-period incentive constraints (UI or VI). We therefore need to characterize the
optimal contract among those that fully extract consumer surplus in each state. Claims
1–5 in the proof establish that this contract is ex-post efficient in state u and induces
no-trade in state v . Consumer types in the range [0,θ ∗) opt for this contract.
Another consequence of relaxing property (*) is that the UIθ constraint is not im-
plied by the fact that the ICθ constraint is satisfied and the VIθ constraint is binding. To
see why, note that the UIθ constraint holds if
u (a uθ )−u (a vθ )≥ tθ (a uθ )− tθ (a vθ ).
If the VIθ constraint is binding, this inequality may be rewritten as
u (a uθ )−v (a uθ )≥ u (a vθ )−v (a vθ ). (12)
If we were to solve the monopolist’s relaxed problem, assuming the solution necessarily
satisfies the UIθ constraint, then we would obtain (by the same arguments as in Propo-
sition 2) that a vθ = e
v . Recall from our discussion of Proposition 2 that the ICθ constraint
implies that the left-hand side of (12) is non-negative. Since a vθ = e
v , property (*) im-
plies that the right-hand side of (12) is negative. Hence, the UIθ constraint is satisfied.
However, once we relax property (*), then it may very well be the case that u (e v )> v (e v ),
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such that the right-hand side of (12) is positive. Hence we can no longer ignore the UIθ
constraint when maximizing the monopolist’s expected profit.
To tackle this problem, we partition the set of types above θ ∗ into two subsets: the
set of types for whom u (a uθ )− v (a uθ ) ≥ u (e v )− v (e v ) (we denote this set by Θ+), and
the set of types for whom this inequality does not hold (we denote this set by Θ−). If
Θ− is empty, then the monopolist’s problem is essentially the same as the problem of
designing the optimal menu for types above p in an environment in which property (∗)
holds. The question is, what is the optimal menu when Θ− is not empty?
To answer this question, we conjecture that the problem of characterizing contracts
in Θ+ is independent of the problem of characterizing contracts in Θ−. This means that
each type in Θ+ is assigned a speculative contract that maximizes the monopolist’s ex-
pected profit, assuming all the necessary constraints are satisfied. The solution to this
maximization problem is that a vθ = e
v and a uθ is given by (11). In addition, each type in
Θ− is assigned a speculative contract that maximizes the monopolist’s expected profit
subject to the constraint that both UIθ and VIθ are binding. This, together with our as-
sumption on u and v , implies that types in Θ− must choose precisely the same action
in each of the states.
The most involved part of the proof is to verify that the above conjecture is correct.
The main step is to show that the incentive compatibility constraints hold. In particular,
we need to show that no type in Θ+ has an incentive to mimic a type in Θ−, and vice
versa. To achieve this, we show that (i) any pair of types, θ ∈Θ+, θ ′ ∈Θ− satisfies θ ′ > θ
and a uθ > e
v > a uθ ′ , and (ii) u (a
u
θ )−v (a uθ ) is non-decreasing on Θ− ∪Θ+ = [θ ∗, 1]. Since
U (φ,θ ) = θ [u (a uφ)−v (a uφ)]+ [v (a vφ)− tφ(a vθ )],
(i) and (ii) together allow us to establish incentive-compatibility (see Claims 6 and 7 in
the proof).
The following example illustrates some aspects of the characterization of optimal
menus. In particular, it demonstrates that if the consumer’s marginal utilities in the two
states are sufficiently wide apart, the optimal menu in the common-prior benchmark is
a singleton, whereas in our model it contains multiple contracts. The restrictiveness of
the example allows us to provide a simple characterization of the optimal menu, includ-
ing a closed solution for the cutoffs.
P 7. Let u ≡ k v , where k > 2; let F (θ ) = θ ; p > 13 ; and c (a ) = 0 for all a .
Then, there exists an optimal menu of contracts with the following properties.
(i) θ ∗ = θ¯ = (k (p +1)−2)/(2k −2).
(ii) For every θ < θ ∗, a uθ = 1, tθ (1) = u (1), a vθ = 0, and tθ (1) = 0.
(iii) For every θ > θ ∗, a uθ = a vθ = 1.
(iv) In contrast, suppose the monopolist believes that the consumer’s private informa-
tion (his prior belief θ ) is the true objective probability of u . Then, the optimal
menu is a singleton, given by (ii) above.
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This example is simple in the sense that the cutoffs θ ∗ and θ¯ coincide. The simplifi-
cation is due to the feature that u−c , v−c , and u−v are all strictly increasing functions.
The characterization of optimal menus in the common-prior and non-common-prior
cases shares several features with this example. In particular, in both cases low types
are offered a contract that induces no trade in state v and efficient trade in state u , and
extracts the consumer’s entire surplus. The crucial difference is that in our model, the
monopolist evaluates the expected revenue from a consumer of type θ who accepts this
contract at p u (1), whereas in the common-prior case, the monopolist evaluates this
contract at θu (1). This in turn implies that in the common-prior case, all consumer
types are offered this contract, whereas in the case of non-common priors the optimal
menu exhibits price discrimination. This qualitative distinction holds for any p as long
as there exists some sufficiently large k > 1 such that u (a )≥ k v (a ) for all a > 0.
6. C 
We have argued that menus of non-linear pricing schemes in monopolistic environ-
ments can be usefully interpreted as a consequence of the monopolist’s attempt to
screen the consumer’s prior belief regarding his future willingness to pay. In particu-
lar, we have demonstrated that in certain environments, price discrimination of this
sort emerges only when the monopolist and the consumer have different priors. Fur-
thermore, in some of our examples the consumer’s actions are independent of the pric-
ing scheme he selects from the menu. In these cases, incentive provision cannot be
the explanation for price discrimination. Rather, some of the pricing schemes on the
menu are bets aimed at consumers whose prior beliefs are sufficiently different from
the monopolist’s.
6.1 The interpretation of non-common priors
We motivated the assumption of non-common priors by the idea that consumers may
have incorrect beliefs due to market inexperience or inherent biases (such as underesti-
mating the level of consumption required for satiation). Indeed, there is a rich psycho-
logical literature on people’s limited ability to forecast future tastes (for a comprehensive
and popular exposition, see Gilbert 2006).
However, we wish to re-emphasize that for a consistent interpretation of the model,
it is not enough to assume that consumers have biased prior beliefs; one has to assume
in addition that consumers do not believe that the monopolist is better informed—
otherwise, they would regard the menu as a signal of the monopolist’s prior and use
it to update their beliefs. One reason consumers may hold this belief is that they are
unaware of their bias, and therefore (erroneously) believe that no other party could be
better informed about their future tastes. Alternatively, consumers may be aware of a
general tendency to hold biased beliefs, yet they may be (erroneously) confident that
they themselves do not suffer from this problem.
Of course, the judgment that consumer types θ 6= p hold incorrect beliefs is not
essential. One could simply assume that the two parties hold different priors, without
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making any assumption as to which of the two parties, if any, is right. Under that inter-
pretation, the monopolist and the consumer simply “agree to disagree”—it is common
knowledge between them that they hold different priors. However, we find the origi-
nal interpretation more interesting, partly because it generates non-trivial predictions.
For example, if we believe that more experienced consumers are less likely to hold bi-
ased beliefs, then our model implies that inexperienced consumers will tend to select
speculative contracts on the menu while experienced consumers will tend to select non-
speculative contracts.
6.2 The independence between the two parties’ priors
The assumption that the monopolist’s prior p is independent of the consumer’s type
θ is quite restrictive. Even if the monopolist believes that the consumer’s prior belief
is biased, why should he rule out the possibility that the consumer is better informed
about his future needs? A more satisfying assumption is that when the consumer’s type
is θ , the monopolist believes that the consumer’s second-period utility function will be
u with probability p (θ ). This generalization subsumes the common-prior case and our
model as special cases, namely p (θ ) = θ and p (θ ) = p , respectively.
It can be shown that the analysis of Section 4 is robust to this generalization, under
the assumption that θ −p (θ ) is a strictly increasing function that attains negative (posi-
tive) values for low (high) θ . Let θ 0 denote the unique solution to the equation p (θ ) = θ .
Then, the characterization of optimal menus is qualitatively the same as in the model of
Section 3, where θ 0 plays the role of p . The task of characterizing optimal menus under
more general classes of p (θ ) is left for future work.
6.3 More than two states
We have restricted our analysis to an environment in which there are only two possible
states of nature. A natural extension of the model is to allow for more than just two
possible utility functions in the second period. Since the consumer type in our model is
given by his prior beliefs, such an extension requires us to consider multi-dimensional
types. Multidimensional mechanism-design introduces a number of technical issues
that are secondary to the main ideas of the current paper, and we therefore leave this
extension for future research.
A
P  P . Since the monopolist knows the consumer’s type, it is
straightforward to show that the IRθ constraint is binding. We may therefore express
the monopolist’s objective function as
θ [u (a uθ )− c (a uθ )]+ (1−θ )[v (a vθ )− c (a vθ )]+δ[t (a vθ )− t (a uθ )+ c (a uθ )− c (a vθ )], (13)
where δ≡ p −θ .
Suppose δ < 0. Then to maximize the above expression subject to the UIθ and VIθ
constraints, the VIθ constraint must bind. By substituting v (a vθ )−v (a uθ ) for t (a vθ )−t (a uθ )
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in (13) and solving for a uθ and a
v
θ that maximize the resulting expression, we obtain the
values given in the statement of the proposition.
It remains to verify that the UIθ constraint holds at the solution for a uθ and a
v
θ , i.e.,
that
u (a uθ )−v (a uθ )≥ u (e v )−v (e v ).
By property (*), u (e v )− v (e v ) ≤ 0. Suppose that the optimal contract under complete
information to type θ , denoted tθ , induces an action a uθ = a
∗ satisfying u (a ∗)− v (a ∗)<
0. Suppose the monopolist offered the consumer a different contract, t ′θ , that satisfies
t ′θ (a ∗) = ∞, t ′θ (e u ) = tθ (a ∗), and t ′θ (e v ) = tθ (e v ). By construction, t ′θ satisfies the IRθ
and VIθ constraints (both constraints are binding). By the assumption that max(u −c )>
max(v − c ), u (e u )− v (e u )> 0. Since the VIθ constraint is binding, it follows that t ′θ also
satisfies the UIθ constraint.
To reach a contradiction, we need to show that t ′θ generates a higher expected profit
than does tθ . Because t ′θ and tθ induce the same action and generate the same profit in
state v , it suffices to show that t ′θ generates a higher profit in state u . Define
W (a )≡ p [u (a )− c (a )]−δ[u (a )−v (a )].
Since both the IRθ and VIθ constraints are binding, the monopolist’s objective function
may be expressed as
W (a uθ )+ (1−θ )[v (a vθ )− c (a vθ )].
By the definition of e u , u (e u )− c (e u )≥ u (a ∗)− c (a ∗). By property (*),
u (e u )−v (e u )> 0≥ u (a ∗)−v (a ∗).
Hence, since δ < 0 we have W (e u )>W (a ∗), in contradiction to our assumption that tθ
is an optimal contract under complete information.
The case of δ> 0 is proven in a similar manner.
Suppose next that δ = 0. Then the monopolist’s objective function, given by (13), is
maximized at the ex-post efficient actions, e u and e v . By property (*), the monopolist
can extract the entire ex-post consumer surplus in each state without violating the UIθ
or VIθ constraints. 
P  L . Assume an optimal menu includes a set of non-speculative con-
tracts T (which may be a singleton) that generate an expected profit for the monopolist
that is lower than his expected profit from the following contract t ∗, the optimal contract
under complete information for θ = p :
t ∗(a ) =

u (e u ) if a = e u
v (e v ) if a = e v
∞ if a /∈ {e u , e v }.
This contract has two important features: it yields zero expected payoff to all types, and
it satisfies the UI and VI constraints of any type who chooses it. LetΘT denote the set of
types whose most preferred contract in the menu is in T .
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Consider amending the original menu by replacing all the contracts in T with t ∗.
Since the original menu is assumed to be optimal, every speculative contract in it must
satisfy the UI and VI constraints. Hence, every contract in the new menu satisfies these
constraints.
We wish to show that there is a way to assign a contract in the new menu to each
consumer type, such that (i) no consumer type is assigned a contract with a negative
expected payoff, (ii) the assigned contract is weakly preferred to any other contract in
the menu, and (iii) the new menu generates a higher expected profit than the original
menu.
By our construction of t ∗, this is straightforward if we can assign t ∗ to every type in
ΘT , while assigning all other types their most preferred contract in the original menu.
Suppose there is a positive measure of types inΘT who strictly prefer a contract t /∈ T to
the contract t ∗. If t is non-speculative, then by the definition of T , the expected profit
from t is larger or equal to the expected profit from t ∗. If t is speculative, then its ex-
pected profit is at least as high as the expected profit from t ∗ (otherwise the monopolist
is able to increase his expected profit by replacing the original menu with one that con-
sists of t ∗ and all the original speculative contracts except for the least profitable one).
Suppose next that there is a positive measure of types outside ΘT whose most pre-
ferred contract in the new menu is t ∗. Then each of these types must have obtained a
strictly negative expected payoff from his most preferred contract in the original menu,
contradicting the IR constraint. 
P  P . Proof of (i). Note first that by IRp , type θ = p cannot be as-
signed a speculative contract. Our proof relies on the following claim.
C. If an optimal menu assigns a speculative contract to a type θ 6= p , then Duθ > 0
and Dvθ < 0 when θ > p , while D
u
θ < 0 and D
v
θ > 0 when θ < p .
P. Suppose θ > p . Let x ≡ θ −p . Then by Definition 1,
(θ −x )Duθ +(1−θ +x )Dvθ < 0.
By IRθ ,
θDuθ +(1−θ )Dvθ ≥ 0.
Because θ > x > 0, these two inequalities imply that Duθ > 0 and D
v
θ < 0. A similar
argument applies for θ < p . Ã
We now show that if a type θ > p is assigned a speculative contract, then a higher
type is also assigned a speculative contract. Assume the optimal menu assigns a spec-
ulative contract to type θ and a non-speculative contract to some type φ > θ . Then by
Lemma 1, U (φ,φ) = 0. By ICφ,θ , a consumer of type φ > θ satisfies U (φ,φ) ≥U (θ ,φ).
By definition, U (θ ,φ) = φ(Duθ −Dvθ ) +Dvθ . Since, by assumption, θ is assigned a spec-
ulative contract, the Claim implies that Duθ −Dvθ > 0 (recall that θ > p ). This, in turn,
implies that U (θ ,φ) >U (θ ,θ ). Since U (θ ,θ ) ≥ 0, we have reached a contradiction. A
similar argument applies for types below p .
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Proof of (ii). Assume the monopolist designs two separate menus such that one is op-
timal for the distribution of types F conditional on θ ∈ [p , 1], and another is optimal
for the distribution F conditional on θ ∈ [0, p ]. Denote the first set of contracts by T+
and the second by T−. We claim that these menus have the property that each type in
[p , 1] (respectively [0, p ]) weakly prefers his assigned contract to every contract in T−
(respectively T+).
By part (i) and Lemma 1, there exist θ l ∈ [p , 1] and θ h ∈ [0, p ] such that U (θ ,θ ) = 0
for all θ ∈ (θl ,θh ). By the Claim, Dvθ > Duθ for all θ ≤ θl , while Duθ > Dvθ for all θ ≥ θh .
In addition, the contract assigned to every θ /∈ (θl ,θh ) violates IRp . It follows that for
every pair of types θ ,φ such that θ ≤ p and φ ≥ θh we have U (φ,θ ) < 0. Similarly,
U (φ′,θ ′)< 0 for every pair of types θ ′,φ′ with θ ′ ≥ p andφ ≤ θl .
By assumption, T+ (respectively T−) maximizes the monopolist’s expected profit
conditional on θ ∈ [p , 1] (respectively θ ∈ [0, 1]). Hence the union of T+ and T− maxi-
mizes the unconditional expected profit of the monopolist. In addition, T+ satisfies the
IR, IC, UI, and VI constraints of the types in [p , 1], while T− satisfies the corresponding
constraints for types in [0, p ]. From the argument made in the previous paragraph, the
set of contracts T+ ∪T− also satisfies these constraints for all types in [0, 1].
Proof of (iii). Consider some type θ ≥ θh . By part (ii), this type is assigned a speculative
contract. Hence, by the Claim, Duθ > 0 and D
v
θ < 0. Let Θ
∗ = {θ ≥ θh : a vθ 6= e v }. Assume
the optimal menu has the property that Θ∗ is non empty. Consider modifying the origi-
nal menu by changing each contract tθ to a new contract t ′θ that differs from the original
contract only in two actions, a vθ and e
v , such that t ′θ (a vθ ) =∞ and t ′θ (e v ) satisfies
v (e v )− t ′θ (e v ) = v (a vθ )− tθ (a vθ ). (14)
Because the consumer’s net payoff in state v under the modified contract is the same
as it is under the original contact, all the IR and IC constraints, as well as VIθ , continue
to hold. To see that UIθ is also satisfied, note that because θ > p and tθ is a spec-
ulative contract, it follows from the Claim that Duθ > 0 and D
v
θ < 0. Hence by (14),
u (a uθ )−t (a uθ )≥ v (e v )−t ′θ (e v ). By property (*), this inequality implies UIθ . Note also that
conditional on the consumer’s type being θ , the contract t ′θ generates a higher expected
profit to the monopolist. This follows from the observation that (14), together with our
assumption on a vθ , implies t
′
θ (e
v )− c (e v )> tθ (a vθ )− c (a vθ ).
It remains to show that the VIθ constraint is binding. Note that by the Claim, Duθ −
Duθ > 0. In what follows, we adopt Krishna’s (2002, 63–66) derivation of incentive com-
patibility for direct mechanisms. Define q (θ )≡Duθ −Dvθ and m (θ )≡−Dvθ . The optimal
menu is incentive compatible if for all types θ andφ,
V (θ )≡ θq (θ )−m (θ )≥φq (θ )−m (φ).
By the Claim, q (θ ) ≥ 0 for all θ ≥ θh (while q (θ ) = 0 for all θ ∈ (θl ,θh ) and q (θ ) ≤ 0 for
all θ ≤ θl ). Hence, the left-hand side of the above inequality is an affine function of the
true value θ . Incentive compatibility implies that for all θ ≥ θ ∗,
V (θ ) = max
φ∈[0,1]{θq (φ)−m (φ)}.
Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) Consumer optimism and price discrimination 485
I.e., V (θ ) is a maximum of a family of affine functions, and hence is convex on [θ ∗ , 1]
(since Duθ =D
v
θ = 0 for all types in [0,θ
∗), V (θ ) = 0 for all these types).
From the standard argument it follows that for all θ > θ ∗ ,
V (θ ) =V (θh )+
∫ θ
θh
q (x )d x .
By part (i), V (θh ) = 0, and so we obtain U (θ ,θ ) =
∫ θ
θh
q (x )d x for θ ≥ θ ∗ .
Assume there is an optimal menu in which the VIθ constraint does not bind for a
positive measure of types above θh . Consider the types θ ≥ θh . Let δθ denote the slack
in the VIθ constraint of type θ . Then
tθ (a vθ )− tθ (a uθ ) = v (a vθ )−v (a uθ )−δθ .
By the previous paragraph, if type θ ≥ θh is assigned a speculative contract, which is
incentive compatible, then
U (θ ,θ ) =
∫ θ
θh
[u (a ux )−v (a ux )−δx ]d x . (15)
Assume the optimal menu satisfies δθ > 0 for some positive measure of types in [θh , 1].
Consider amending the menu by changing only tθ (a vθ ) for all types θ ≥ θh such that
the new transfer is equal to tθ (a vθ ) + δθ , making the VIθ constraint bind for all these
types. Clearly, this change does not violate the UIθ constraint of these types. From
(15), it follows that the incentive compatibility constraints are not violated, and that
this change only raises U (θ ,θ ). Hence, the IRθ constraint is also not violated. Since
this new menu only increases the monopolist’s revenue without changing his costs (the
new menu induces exactly the same actions for each type as does the original menu), it
increases the expected profit, in contradiction to our assumption that the original menu
was optimal.
Proof of (iv). The proof is essentially the same as that for part (iii). 
P  P . We provide a detailed proof for the distribution of types F ,
conditional on θ ∈ [p , 1]. An optimal menu for types distributed on [0, p ) is derived by
essentially the same argument.
Assume that F satisfies the monotone hazard rate condition. Proposition 2 implies
the following. First, we may restrict attention to menus that induce a vθ = e
v for θ ≥ p .
Second, the monopolist’s problem may be written as
max
θh ,{a uθ ,t uθ }θ∈[θh ,1]

F (θh )− F (p )
1− F (p )

{p [u (e u )− c (e u )]+ (1−p )[v (e v )− c (e v )]}
+
∫ 1
θh
{p [tθ (a uθ )− c (a uθ )]+ (1−p )[tθ (e v )− c (e v )]}

d
F (θ )
1− F (p )
 (16)
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subject to the IRθ , ICθ ,φ , UIθ , and VIθ constraints for all types θ and φ. We adopt the
standard practice in mechanism design (see Krishna 2002) of solving this problem un-
der the assumption that these constraints are satisfied (moreover, we assume the VIθ
constraint is binding for all θ ≥ θh ), and then checking that this is true at the solution
we obtain.
For the optimal menu, the VIθ constraint must bind for all θ ≥ θh , hence
tθ (a uθ ) = tθ (a
v
θ )+v (a
u
θ )−v (e v ). (17)
This allows us to simplify the objective function of the monopolist rewriting (16) as∫ 1
θh

(1−p )[tθ (e v )− c (e v )− tθ (a uθ )+ c (a uθ )]+ tθ (a uθ )− c (a uθ )	d F (θ )1− F (p )

=
∫ 1
θh

(1−p )[v (e v )− c (e v )−v (a uθ )+ c (a uθ )]+ tθ (a uθ )− c (a uθ )	d F (θ )1− F (p )

.
By (15)—given that VIθ is binding—and since U (θ ,θ ) = θq (θ )−m (θ ),
tθ (a vθ ) = θq (θ )+v (e
v )−
∫ θ
θh
q (x )d x . (18)
Substituting this expression into (17), we obtain
tθ (a uθ ) = θq (θ )−
∫ θ
θh
q (x )d x +v (a uθ ). (19)
We can thus simplify the optimization problem by expressing the objective as a function
only of the cutoff θh and the actions {a uθ }θ∈[θh ,1]:
max
θh ,{a uθ }θ∈[θh ,1]

[F (θh )− F (p )]p [u (e u )− c (e u )]
+
∫ 1
θh

θq (θ )−
∫ θ
θh
q (x )d x +p [v (a uθ )− c (a uθ )]

d F (θ )

Note that we have taken the constant (1−p )[v (e v )−c (e v )] out of the objective function.
By interchanging the order of integration in∫ 1
θh
∫ θ
θh
q (x )d x
we can rewrite this expression as∫ 1
θh
[1− F (θ )]q (θ )dθ .
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We can thus replace ∫ 1
θh
[θq (θ )−
∫ θ
θh
q (x )d x ]d F (θ )
with ∫ 1
θh
ψF (θ )q (θ )d F (θ ),
whereψF (θ ) is defined in (5). Because VIθ is binding we can replace q (θ ) with u (a uθ )−
v (a uθ ) to obtain the objective function
max
θh ,{a uθ }θ∈[θh ,1]

[F (θh )−F (p )]p [u (e u )− c (e u )]
+
∫ 1
θh
{ψF (θ )[u (a uθ )−v (a uθ )]+p [v (a uθ )− c (a uθ )]}d F (θ )
 (20)
Because F satisfies the monotone hazard rate property, it follows that the optimal a uθ for
each θ ∈ [θh , 1] is given by (6).
The optimal cutoff θh is the value of θ that solves a first-order condition, which rep-
resents the monopolist’s indifference between the optimal non-speculative contract de-
scribed in Lemma 1 and the second-best contract. That is, θh satisfies
p [u (e u )− c (e u )] =max
a

ψF (θ )[u (a )−v (a )]+p [v (a )− c (a )]	.
By the monotone hazard rate property, ψF (θ ) is increasing in θ . Therefore there is a
unique value of θh that solves this equation, given byψF (θh ) = p .
It remains to verify that the menu we constructed indeed satisfies all the necessary
constraints. We begin by verifying that for type θh both the IRθh and the VIθh constraints
are binding. We do this by letting tθh (a
v
θh
) and tθh (a
u
θh
) be the solutions to the system of
equations
θh [u (a uθh )− tθh (a uθh )]+ (1−θh )[v (e v )− tθh (e v )] = 0
v (e v )− tθh (e v ) = v (a uθh )− tθh (a uθh ).
Similarly, we verify that the VIθ constraint of all types θ > θh is binding by setting tθ (a vθ )
and tθ (a uθ ) according to equations (18) and (19).
In verifying the remaining constraints, we rely on the following claim, which estab-
lishes two important properties of q (θ ).
C. q (θ ) is non-decreasing, and q (θh )≥ 0.
P. Since, by construction, the VIθ constraint is binding for all θ ≥ θh , q (θ ) is non-
decreasing for these types if and only if u (a uθ )− v (a uθ ) is non-decreasing for all θ ≥ θh .
Consider a pair of typesφ,θ such thatφ >θ . By construction,
ψF (φ)[u (a uφ)−v (a uφ)]+p [v (a uφ)− c (a uφ)]≥ψF (φ)[u (a uθ )−v (a uθ )]+p [v (a uθ )− c (a uθ )]
488 Eliaz and Spiegler Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
and
ψF (θ )[u (a uθ )−v (a uθ )]+p [v (a uθ )− c (a uθ )]≥ψF (θ )[u (a uφ)−v (a uφ)]+p [v (a uφ)− c (a uφ)]
Adding these two inequalities and cancelling common terms yields
[ψF (φ)−ψF (θ )]{[u (a uφ)−v (a uφ)]− [u (a uθ )−v (a uθ )]} ≥ 0.
Because F satisfies the monotone hazard rate property, ψF (φ) > ψF (θ ). Therefore,
u (a uφ)−v (a uφ)≥ u (a uθ )−v (a uθ ).
Let us now show that q (θh )≥ 0. Recall that we determined θh as the unique solution
of ψF (θ ) = p . Together with (6), this means that a uθh = e
u . By assumption, u (e u )−
v (e u )> 0, hence q (θh )≥ 0. Ã
We now verify that the ICθ ,φ constraints are satisfied for every distinct pair of types
θ ,φ ∈ [θh , 1]. Since, by the Claim, q (θ ) ≥ 0 for all θ ≥ θh , incentive compatibility is
equivalent to the requirement that q (θ ) is non-decreasing on [θh , 1] (see Krishna 2002,
68), which is the case, according to the Claim.
Next, we verify that the UIθ constraint is satisfied for all θ ∈ [θh , 1]. Since a vθ = e v
and since the VIθ constraint is binding by construction, the UIθ constraint is satisfied if
and only if u (a uθ )− v (a uθ )≥ u (e v )− v (e v ). By property (*), u (e v )− v (e v )< 0 and by the
Claim, u (a uθ )−v (a uθ )≥ 0 for all θ ≥ θh .
Finally, we verify that the IRθ constraint is satisfied for all θ ∈ [θh , 1]. We have already
shown, by construction, that this constraint is binding for θ = θh , i.e., that U (θh ,θh ) = 0.
By the Claim, U (θh ,θ )>U (θh ,θh ) for all θ > θh and by ICθ ,θh , U (θ ,θ )≥U (θh ,θ ). 
P  P . At type θh the monopolist is indifferent between offering a
speculative contract and a non-speculative contract. By Lemma 1, the monopolist’s ex-
pected profit from a non-speculative contract is
p [u (e u )− c (e u )]+ (1−p )[v (e v )− c (e v )].
From the proof of Proposition 3 it follows that the monopolist’s expected profit from a
speculative contract offered to a type θ is given by
(1−p )[v (e v )− c (e v )−v (a uθh )+ c (a uθh )]+ tθh (a uθh )− c (a uθh )
(see (16)). The transfer tθh (a
u
θh
) is then derived by equating these two amounts. The
transfer tθ (a uθ ) for each θ > θh is computed according to (19) from Proposition 3. For
each θ ≥ θh we let tθ (e v ) = tθ (a uθ )− v (a uθ ) + v (e v ), thereby guaranteeing that the VIθ
constraint binds for these types. The transfers made by types in [0,θl ] are constructed
in an analogous way. 
P  P . Assume p < 1. Note first that an optimal menu cannot con-
tain only speculative contracts since this would violate the IR constraints of types in the
neighborhood of p . Suppose the optimal menu includes no speculative contracts. Then
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by Lemma 1, we may restrict attention to the optimal contract under complete informa-
tion for type θ = p , which guarantees each type his reservation payoff. Consider some
0< " < u (e u )−v (e u ) that satisfies
0<
"
u (e u )−v (e u )− " <
1−p
p
.
Then
p [u (e u )− "]+ (1−p )[v (e v )+u (e u )−v (e u )− "]> p u (e u )+ (1−p )v (e v ). (21)
In addition, there exists θ¯ < 1 sufficiently close to 1 that satisfies
θ¯ "− (1− θ¯ )[u (e u )−v (e u )− "] = 0. (22)
Suppose that the monopolist added to the original menu the following contract t :
t (a ) =

u (e u )− " if a = e u
v (e v )+u (e u )−v (e u )− " if a = e v
∞ if a /∈ {e u , e v }.
By (22), all types θ > θ¯ strictly prefer t to t ∗, while the opposite is true for types below θ¯ .
By (21) and the continuity of F , the expected profit from the new menu is strictly higher
than from the original menu, which is a contradiction.
Assume next that p = 1. Suppose v lies strictly above u at some a ∈ [0, 1]. Then we
can apply essentially the same argument as the one given in the previous paragraph to
show that the optimal contract must contain at least one speculative contract. Suppose
next that u (a ) ≥ v (a ) for all a . When the monopolist knows the consumer’s type, his
objective is to solve the maximization problem
max
t u ,t v ,a u ,a v
t u − c (a u )
subject to
θ [u (a u )− t u ]+ (1−θ )[v (a v )− t v ]≥ 0 (IR)
u (a u )− t u ≥ u (a v )− t v (UR)
v (a v )− t v ≥ v (a u )− t u . (VR)
Since u (a )≥ v (a ) for every a , the UI constraint implies u (a u )− t u ≥ v (a v )− t v . By the
IR constraint, t u ≤ u (a u ). Therefore, the monopolist’s objective function is bounded
from above by u (a u )−c (a u ). It follows that the non-speculative contract, which extracts
u (e u ) in state u and v (e v ) in state v , maximizes the monopolist’s profit, regardless of the
consumer’s type. Therefore, the optimal menu contains no speculative contracts. 
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P  P . We proceed by proving a series of claims.
C 1. Any contract tθ in an optimal menu satisfies Duθ ≥max(0, Dvθ ).
P. First, note that by IRθ , there exists no tθ with Duθ ≤ 0 and Dvθ ≤ 0, where one
of these inequalities is strict. Suppose Duθ ≤ 0 and Dvθ > 0 for some contract tθ . Then,
u (a uθ )− tθ (a uθ ) ≤ 0. Hence, by UIθ , u (a vθ )− tθ (a vθ ) ≤ 0. Since u (a ) ≥ v (a ) for all a ,
v (a vθ )− tθ ∗ (a vθ ) ≤ 0, contradicting our initial assumption that Dvθ > 0. It follows that
Duθ ≥ 0 for every θ . Suppose Duθ < Dvθ for some contract tθ . Then, u (a uθ )− tθ (a uθ ) <
v (a vθ )− tθ (a vθ )≤ u (a vθ )− tθ (a vθ ), contradicting UIθ . Ã
C 2. (i) There exists a non-empty subset of typesΘ∗ ⊆ [0, 1] such that for every θ ∈Θ∗
the IRθ constraint binds.
(ii) Let θ ∗ ≡maxθ Θ∗. If θ ∗ > 0, then Duθ =Dvθ = 0 for all θ < θ ∗.
(iii) If θ ∗ < 1, then for any pair of types (θ ,θ ′) satisfying θ > θ ′ ≥ θ ∗, Duθ ′ −Dvθ ′ > 0
implies Duθ −Dvθ > 0.
P. To prove (i), suppose the IRθ constraint did not bind for any of the types. Then
the monopolist could strictly increase his profit by raising tθ (a uθ ) and tθ (a
v
θ ) by an arbi-
trarily small " > 0 for all types.
To prove (ii), suppose θ ∗ > 0 but there is some type θ < θ ∗ for whom it is not true
that Duθ =D
v
θ = 0. Note first that if D
u
θ =D
v
θ 6= 0, then by Claim 1, Duθ =Dvθ > 0. But this
contradicts the definition of Θ∗. Suppose next that Duθ ∗ > Dvθ ∗ . By the ICθ ∗,θ constraint,
θ ∗(Duθ −Dvθ )+Dvθ ≤ 0. But since θ < θ ∗ and Duθ −Dvθ > 0, θ (Duθ −Dvθ )+Dvθ <θ ∗(Duθ −Dvθ )+
Dvθ , in violation of IRθ .
Finally, to prove (iii), assume that θ ∗ < 1 yet Duθ ′ −Dvθ ′ > 0 and Duθ −Dvθ ≤ 0 for some
θ > θ ′ ≥ θ ∗. By Claim 1, Duθ = Dvθ = 0. By the IRθ ′ constraint, θ ′(Duθ ′ −Dvθ ′ ) +Dvθ ′ ≥ 0.
Because θ > θ ′ and Duθ ′ −Dvθ ′ > 0, θ (Duθ ′ −Dvθ ′ )+Dvθ ′ > θ ′(Duθ ′ −Dvθ ′ )+Dvθ ′ , in violation
of ICθ ,θ ′ . Ã
C 3. The VIθ constraint is binding for all types θ ≥ θ ∗.
The proof is essentially the same as the proof in Proposition 3 that the VIθ constraint is
binding for all types θ ≥ θh , and therefore omitted.
C 4. An optimal menu has the property that for all types θ < θ ∗, a uθ = e u , tθ (e u ) =
u (e u ), a vθ = 0, and tθ (0) = 0.
P. By Claim 2, Duθ = D
v
θ = 0 for all types θ ≤ θ ∗. Since v (a ) < u (a ) for all a > 0,
UIθ implies a vθ = 0 and tθ (a
v
θ ) = 0 for all types θ ≤ θ ∗. This means that the monopolist’s
profit from each θ ≤ θ ∗ is p [u (a uθ )− c (a uθ )]. Therefore, the optimal contract for each
θ ≤ θ ∗ must satisfy a uθ = e u . Ã
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C 5. Suppose the optimal menu is incentive compatible and individually rational
and satisfies the VIθ constraint of each type with equality. Then the contract assigned to
each θ ∈ [θ ∗, 1] induces an action pair (a uθ , a vθ ) that maximizes
[ψ(θ )−p ][u (a uθ )−v (a uθ )]+p [u (a uθ )− c (a uθ )]+ (1−p )[v (a vθ )− c (a vθ )] (23)
subject to the UIθ constraint.
P. The proof applies the same arguments as those used in the proof of Proposi-
tion 3 to obtain the objective function (20). The only difference is that here we include
the term (1−p )[v (a vθ )− c (a vθ )] inside the objective function because in contrast to the
environment of Section 3, we cannot prove directly that a vθ = e
v . Ã
Before we proceed to the next sequence of claims, we introduce the following nota-
tion. DefineΘ+ as the subset of types in [θ ∗, 1] for whom u (a uθ )−v (a uθ )≥ u (e v )−v (e v ),
where a uθ is given by (11). Let Θ
− = [θ ∗, 1]/Θ+. Note that if θ ∗ < 1, then at least one of
the two sets, Θ+ or Θ−, is non-empty.
C 6. Suppose bothΘ+ andΘ− are non-empty. Assume that an optimal menu assigns
to each type inΘ+ the action pair (a uθ , a
v
θ ), where a
u
θ is given by (11) and a
v
θ = e
v . Assume
further that the menu assigns to each type inΘ− the action pair (a uθ , a vθ ) given by (9). Then
(i) for any pair of types θ ∈Θ+and θ ′ ∈Θ−, θ ′ >θ and a uθ > e v > a uθ ′
(ii) u (a uθ )−v (a uθ ) is non-decreasing on Θ− ∪Θ+ = [θ ∗, 1].
P. (i) We first claim that Θ+ includes all the types for whom ψ(θ ) ≥ 0. To see
why, consider a type θ with ψ(θ ) ≥ 0. By our assumptions on u and v , the difference
u (a )− v (a ) is strictly increasing and reaches a maximum at a = 1. Suppose a uθ ≤ e v .
Since ψ(θ ) ≥ 0, (∂ /∂ a )[u (a )− v (a )] > 0, and (∂ /∂ a )[v (a )− c (a )] > 0, if we were to
increase a by an infinitesimal amount, we would strictly increase the objective function
(23), a contradiction. It follows that under an optimal menu, a uθ > e
v . But this means
that u (a uθ )−v (a uθ )≥ u (e v )−v (e v ).
From the previous paragraph, it follows that for every θ ∈ Θ−, ψ(θ ) < 0. We now
show that a uθ ′ < e
v for all θ ′ ∈Θ−. Suppose, to the contrary, that a uθ ′ ≥ e v for some type
θ ′ ∈ Θ−. Since ψ(θ ′) < 0, (∂ /∂ a )[u (a )− v (a )] > 0, and (∂ /∂ a )[v (a )− c (a )] ≥ 0, if we
were to decrease a by an infinitesimal amount, we would strictly increase the objective
function
ψ(θ ′)[u (a uθ ′ )−v (a uθ ′ )]+ [v (a uθ ′ )− c (a uθ ′ )], (24)
a contradiction. It follows that under an optimal menu, a uθ ′ ≤ e v .
Consider a pair of types θ ∈Θ+ and θ ′ ∈Θ−. Sinceψ(θ ′)< 0, θ ′ <θ for every θ ∈Θ+
with ψ(θ ) ≥ 0. Suppose there exists θ ∈ Θ+ with ψ(θ ) < 0 such that θ < θ ′ for some
θ ′ ∈Θ−. Let
b uθ ′ ∈ arg max
a

ψ(θ ′)[u (a uθ ′ )−v (a uθ ′ )]+p [v (a uθ ′ )− c (a uθ ′ )]	.
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The same argument we used to show that for θ ′ ∈ Θ− expression (24) is maximized by
a uθ ′ < e
v implies that b uθ < e
v . By assumption, θ ∈ Θ+ implies that a uθ is given by (11).
Hence
ψ(θ )[u (a uθ )−v (a uθ )]+p [v (a uθ )−c (a uθ )]≥ψ(θ )[u (b uθ ′ )−v (b uθ ′ )]+p [v (b uθ ′ )−c (b uθ ′ )]. (25)
As was shown in the first paragraph of the proof, a uθ ≥ e v , and therefore u (a uθ )−v (a uθ )>
u (b uθ ′ )−v (b uθ ′ )≥ 0. Since, by assumption,ψ(θ )< 0 and p ≥ 0, inequality (25) holds only
if v (a uθ )− c (a uθ )> v (b uθ ′ )− c (b uθ ′ ). By the definition of b uθ ′ ,
ψ(θ ′)[u (b uθ ′ )−v (b uθ ′ )]+p [v (b uθ ′ )−c (b uθ ′ )]≥ψ(θ ′)[u (a uθ )−v (a uθ )]+p [v (a uθ )−c (a uθ )]. (26)
Adding inequalities (25) and (26), and cancelling common terms yields
[ψ(θ ′)−ψ(θ )][u (b uθ ′ )−v (b uθ ′ )]− [u (a uθ )−v (a uθ )]	≥ 0.
Sinceψ(θ ′) >ψ(θ ) and u (b uθ ′ )− v (b uθ ′ ) < u (a uθ )− v (a uθ ), the left hand side of the above
inequality is strictly negative, a contradiction. It follows that θ > θ ′ for every θ ∈Θ+and
θ ′ ∈Θ−.
(ii) We first show that u (a uθ )− v (a uθ ) is non-decreasing on Θ+. Since the difference
u (a )− v (a ) is strictly increasing in a , it suffices to show that a uθ is non-decreasing on
Θ+. Consider a pair of typesφ,θ ∈Θ+ such thatφ >θ . By construction,
ψ(φ)[u (a uφ)−v (a uφ)]+p [v (a uφ)− c (a uφ)]≥ψ(φ)[u (a uθ )−v (a uθ )]+p [v (a uθ )− c (a uθ )]
and
ψ(θ )[u (a uθ )−v (a uθ )]+p [v (a uθ )− c (a uθ )]≥ψ(θ )[u (a uφ)−v (a uφ)]+p [v (a uφ)− c (a uφ)].
Adding these two inequalities and cancelling common terms yields
[ψ(φ)−ψ(θ )][u (a uφ)−v (a uφ)]− [u (a uθ )−v (a uθ )]	≥ 0.
Sinceφ >θ andψ is an increasing function,ψ(φ)>ψ(θ ). Hence, for the above inequal-
ity to hold, it must be that u (a uφ)− v (a uφ) ≥ u (a uθ )− v (a uθ ). In a similar manner we can
show that u (a uθ )−v (a uθ ) is non-decreasing on Θ−. Ã
C 7. The optimal menu assigns each type in Θ+ the action pair (a uθ , a
v
θ ) given by
a vθ = e
v and (11), and if Θ− is not empty it assigns each type in this set the action pair
(a uθ , a
v
θ ) given by (9).
P. First, note that becauseψ(1) = 1 andψ is an increasing function,Θ+ 6=∅. Since
the action pair (a uθ , a
v
θ ) given by a
v
θ = e
v and (11) is the solution to the unconstrained
maximization of (23), we need to show that it satisfies all the necessary constraints. We
do this first for all θ ∈Θ+ \ {θ ∗}, and then later treat the case of θ ∗ ∈Θ+ separately.
We begin with the VIθ constraint, which we assumed to be binding for each θ ≥ θ ∗.
To verify that indeed this is true for all θ ∈Θ+, we simply set tθ (a vθ ) and tθ (a uθ ) according
to the equations (18) and (19).
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Next we verify that the UIθ constraint is satisfied for all θ ∈ Θ+. Since the VIθ con-
straint is binding for these types, tθ (a uθ )− tθ (a vθ ) = v (a uθ )− v (a vθ ). This means that the
UIθ constraint is satisfied if and only if u (a uθ )−v (a uθ )≥ u (a vθ )−v (a vθ ). By the definition
of Θ+, this must be true for every type in this set.
We now verify that for every pair θ ,θ ′ ∈ Θ+, the ICθ ,θ ′ constraint is satisfied. In-
centive compatibility between any two types in some subset of [0, 1] is equivalent to the
requirement that q (θ ) is non-decreasing on this subset. Since VIθ binds for all θ ∈ Θ+,
q (θ ) is non-decreasing for these types if and only if u (a uθ )− v (a uθ ) is non-decreasing on
Θ+. But this follows from part (ii) of Claim 6.
There are two remaining constraints that we need to verify: first, that each θ ∈ Θ+
satisfies the IRθ constraint, and second, that for each θ ∈Θ+ and each θ ′ ∈ [0, 1]\Θ+, the
ICθ ,θ ′ constraint is satisfied. In addition, we need to characterize the contract assigned
to the threshold type θ ∗. To do all this, we distinguish between two cases.
Case 1: θ ∗ ∈Θ+. We need to show that the IRθ and ICθ ,φ constraints are satisfied for
every θ ,φ ∈ [θ ∗, 1]. The proof is essentially the same as the proof that these con-
straints are satisfied for every θ ,φ ∈ [θh , 1] in Proposition 3 (with θ ∗ playing the
role of θh ).
Case 2: θ ∗ /∈Θ+. What this case means is that for θ = θ ∗, a solution to the unconstrained
maximization of (23), which satisfies the VIθ ∗ constraint with equality, necessarily
violates the UIθ ∗ constraint. This means that in order to solve for (a uθ ∗ , a
v
θ ∗ ), we
must solve the constrained optimization problem of maximizing (23) subject to
the constraint that both the UIθ ∗ and VIθ ∗ constraints are binding.
By Claim 6, the difference u (a uθ )−v (a uθ ), evaluated at a uθ given by (11), is positive
and non-decreasing. This means that there cannot be a pair of types φ > θ such
that for a uφ , a
u
θ defined by (11), u (a
u
θ )− v (a uθ ) > 0 while u (a uφ)− v (a uφ) < 0. This
means that there exists a unique threshold type θ ∈ (θ ∗, 1) such that Θ+ = [θ , 1]
and Θ− = [θ ∗,θ ).
Suppose the UIθ constraint binds for some type θ . Then
tθ (a uθ )− tθ (a vθ ) = u (a uθ )−u (a vθ ). (27)
Since the VIθ constraint must also bind,
tθ (a uθ )− tθ (a vθ ) = v (a uθ )−v (a vθ ).
It follows that (27) holds if and only if
u (a vθ )−v (a vθ ) = u (a uθ )−v (a uθ ).
But since by assumption, the difference u (a )− v (a ) is strictly increasing in a , it
follows that a uθ = a
v
θ . Hence, a
u
θ and a
v
θ are given by (9).
It follows that for every θ ∈ Θ−, a uθ and a vθ are given by (9). Define tθ ∗ (a uθ ∗ ) and
tθ ∗ (a vθ ∗ ) to be the solutions to the pair of equations defined by the requirement
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that IRθ ∗ and VIθ ∗ are binding. By construction, the IRθ constraint of type θ ∗ is
binding, while for any θ > θ ∗, this constraint is satisfied if the ICθ ,θ ∗ constraint is
satisfied.
We now verify that for every pair of types θ ,θ ′ ∈ Θ−, the ICθ ,θ ′ constraint is sat-
isfied. As before, we achieve this by showing that q (θ ) is non-decreasing on Θ−.
Since the VIθ constraint is binding for all θ ∈Θ−, this is equivalent to showing that
u (a uθ )−v (a uθ ) is non-decreasing on Θ−. But this follows from part (ii) of Claim 6.
Next, we verify that for every θ ′ ∈ Θ− and θ ′′ ∈ Θ+, the ICθ ′,θ ′′ and ICθ ′′,θ ′ con-
straints are satisfied. As explained before, to achieve this it suffices to show that
q (θ ) is non-decreasing on [θ ∗, 1]. Since we have already shown that the VIθ con-
straint is binding for all θ ∈ [θ ∗, 1], this is equivalent to showing that u (a uθ )−v (a uθ )
is non-decreasing on [θ ∗, 1]. Since we have also shown that u (a uθ )−v (a uθ ) is non-
decreasing on both Θ+ and Θ−, and that θ ′′ > θ ′ for any (θ ′,θ ′′) ∈ Θ− ×Θ+, it
remains to be shown that u (a uθ ′′ )− v (a uθ ′′ ) ≥ u (a uθ ′ )− v (a uθ ′ ). Because the differ-
ence u (a )−v (a ) is increasing for all a , this is equivalent to showing that a uθ ′′ > a uθ ′ .
But this follows from part (i) of Claim 6.
We have therefore shown that the contract assigned to all types at or above the
cutoff θ ∗ satisfy all the required constraints. We now verify that all the necessary
constraints are satisfied for types below the cutoff. These types are assigned a
contract that guarantees them a zero indirect utility (hence, IRθ trivially holds for
all θ < θ ∗). In addition, for each θ < θ ∗, a uθ = e u , a vθ = 0, and Duθ = Dvθ = 0. It
follows that for each of these types, the UIθ constraint binds, and because v (e u )<
u (e u ), the VIθ constraint is satisfied. Finally, we need to verify that for every θ <
θ ∗ ≤φ, the ICθ ,φ constraints are satisfied. To do so, note that since IR∗θ binds and
since we verified above that ICθ ∗,φ holds,
θ ∗q (φ)+Dvφ ≤ 0
for everyφ ≥ θ ∗. Since q (φ)≥ 0, this means that for every θ < θ ∗,
θq (φ)+Dvφ ≤ 0.
It follows that the ICθ ,φ constraints are satisfied.
Finally, we show that if θ ∗ ∈ Θ−, then either θ ∗ = 0 or there exists a unique cut-
off type θ ∗ at which the monopolist is indifferent between assigning the contract
given by Claim 4 and a contract assigned to types in Θ−. By definition, θ ∗ is a
type with the property that every lower type is assigned the contract described in
Claim 4. Let
h(θ )≡ max
a∈[0,1]

ψ(θ )[u (a )−v (a )]+ [v (a )− c (a )]	−p max
a∈[0,1][u (a )− c (a )].
Then, θ ∗ = 0 (respectively, θ ∗ /∈ Θ−) whenever h(θ ) ≥ 0 (respectively, h(θ ) < 0)
for every θ ∈ [0, θ¯ ). If, however, there exists a solution θ ∗ ∈ Θ− to the equation
h(θ ) = 0, then we need to show that this solution is unique.
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Since ψ(θ ) is non-decreasing and u lies above v , h(θ ) is non-decreasing. Since
ψ(0)< 0,ψ(0) = 1, andψ(0) is non-decreasing, there exists a unique solution θ 0 ∈
[0, 1] to the equationψ(θ 0) = 0. Recall thatψ(θ )< 0 for all θ ∗ ∈Θ. It follows that if
h(θ 0)< 0, then h(θ )< 0 for every θ < θ 0, implying that θ ∗ /∈Θ−. If h(0)> 0, then
this remains true for every θ ∈ [0, θ¯ ), implying that θ ∗ = 1. If, however, h(0) < 0
while h(θ 0)> 0, then since h(θ ) is non-decreasing, there exists a unique solution
θ ∗ ∈Θ− to the equation h(θ ) = 0. Ã
To complete the proof of the proposition, it remains to derive the consumers’ pay-
ments in each state. This is essentially the same as in the proof of Proposition 4, hence
we do not provide a separate derivation. 
P  P . We begin by computing the optimal contract for types be-
low the cutoff θ ∗. From Proposition 6, it follows that a uθ = 1, tθ (1) = u (1), a vθ = 0,
and tθ (0) = 0. Hence the monopolist’s profit from each type who signs this contract
is p (θ )u (1) = p (θ )k v (1). Let us turn to the contracts for types above θ ∗. Assume that
θ ∗ ≥ 12 − p/(2(k −1)). Then, expressions (9) and (11) imply a uθ = a vθ = 1 for all θ ≥ θ ∗.
In particular, this means that θ¯ = θ ∗. The monopolist’s revenue from types θ > θ ∗ is
θ ∗u (1) + (1− θ ∗)v (1), while its revenue from each θ < θ ∗ is p u (1). The monopolist’s
expected revenue is thus
[θ ∗ ·p k +(1−θ ∗)(θ ∗(k −1)+1)]v (1).
The optimal cutoff is thus given by
θ ∗ = k (p +1)−2
2k −2 ,
which is greater than 12 −p/(2(k −1)), since p ≥ 13 .
Let us turn to the case of common priors. It can be shown that since arg max(u−c ) =
arg max(v − c ) = arg max(u − v ) = 1, the characterization of the optimal menu shares
some features with the optimal menu under non-common priors. In particular, there
exists a cutoff θ ∗∗ such that for every θ < θ ∗∗, a uθ = 1 and a vθ = 0, whereas for every
θ > θ ∗∗, a uθ = a vθ = 1. This means that all types below θ ∗∗ are assigned the contract
t (1) = u (1), t (0) = 0 (and t (a ) =∞ for all other a ), while all types above θ ∗∗ are assigned
the contract t (1) = θ ∗∗u (1) + (1−θ ∗∗)v (1) (and t (a ) =∞ for all other a ). Thus, the mo-
nopolist’s expected revenue is∫ θ ∗∗
0
θk v (1)dθ +[(1−θ ∗∗)(θ ∗∗(k −1)+1)]v (1).
The optimal cutoff is thus θ ∗∗ = 1. This means that all types are offered the same con-
tract: t (1) = u (1), t (0) = 0 (and t (a ) =∞ for all other a ). 
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